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The modal marker～to omou is preceded by various types of embedded 
propositions, such as a speaker’s belief, desire, intention, etc. Although 
Japanese sentences have been categorized by many scholars (e.g., Miyaji 
1971; Teramura 1984; Moriyama 1988; Masuoka 1991; Nitta 1991a, b), 
these categorizations attempt to classify the whole sentences, and therefore 
are not applicable to embedded propositions preceding ～to omou. Also, 
although Moriyama’s (1992) pioneering study attempts to categorize the 
propositions into two groups of “subjective ”and “objective，” its categoriza-
tion is heavily dependent on contexts, and accordingly it must be taken 
case-by-case. Here, it is necessary to create a systematic categorization 
specifically effective for embedded propositions. In this study, according 
to Searle’s (1983）“direction of fit，” embedded propositions are classified 
into three types of representational modes: Believing, Wanting, and Feeling. 
Believing refers to the mode of true-or-false, Wanting to fulfillment, and 
Feeling to neither true田町田falsenor fulfillment. 
By attaching omou, the degree of the speaker’s“commitment ”to the 
propositional contents of Believing and his “involvement ”to that of Want-
ing and Feeling decreases. The speaker’s“involvement ”in Feeling refers 
to how deeply he is engaged in a state of current feeling, whereas in Want-
ing to how determined he is in fulfilling his desire, intention, etc. 
Furthermore, Japanese verbs of mental activity are classified by utilizing 
the framework of representational modes, and kangaeru and kanjiru are 
grouped together with omou. It was discovered that the attachment of 
both kangaeru and kanjiru creates an implication di百erentfrom the one 
of omou because of their cognition/a妊ectorientation. This study will 
improve our understanding of how a human being’s mind is related to 
language when expressing his thought. 
＊横溝紳一郎： Lecturer, Center for Japanese Studies, Nanzan University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regarding the function of the attachment of ～to omou/omotte iru to embedded 
propositions, various proposals have been made by linguists. Example sen-
tences1 introduced by those linguists are as follows: 
( 1 ) Moshiwake nai to omotte iru. (Ando 1982) 
(I am thinki時 that)2I am sorry. 
( 2) Watashi, ima no mama o kofuku to omotte imasu印a.(Suzuki 1976) 
(I think) I am happy with things the way they are now. 
( 3) Boku wαhontδni anata ni sumanai to omotte iru. (Suzuki 1976) 
(I think) I am really sorry to you. 
( 4) Watashi加。Anoshay・ikz・dato omou/omotte iru. (N akau 1979; K凶 1ihiro
1985; Shinzato 1991) 
I thinlζ／（am thinking) that Ann is honest. 
( S) Fuan ga nai ningen to iu no watashi wa kachi ga nai to omoimasu. 
(Shinzato 1991) 
Those who have no worries are not worth much, I think. 
( 6) Boku wa zettai ni Jon ga hannin da to omou. (Iwasaki 1993) 
I positively think that John is the culprit. 
These example sentences appear to be classifiable into two groups according 
to the types of embedded clause. The first group is the one whose embedded 
clause refers to the speaker’s personal feeling and includes sentences (1), (2), 
and (3). The second group is the one whose embedded clause refers to the 
speaker’s judgment about the other party and includes sentences (4), (5), and 
(6). In order to appropriately grasp the global function of the attachment of 
～to omou/omotte iru, it is necessary to systematically categorize embedded 
propositions preceding ～to omou/omotte ir仏 Therefore,this study will pursue 
a clear categorization of their types and introduce linguistic phenomena which 
are explainable within the framework of the proposed categorization. Contribu回
tions which this study is able to offer include (1) an account of the fundamental 
function of ～to omozゆmotteiru, (2) a categorization of verbs of mental activity, 
and (3) an account of similarities and differences among the respective interpre-
tations of ～to kangaeru/omou/kanjiru. 
of 
Sentences in the Japanese language have been categorized by many scholars 
(Miyaji 1971; Nitta 1979; Teramura 1984; Moriyama 1988; Mo向rama1991; 
1 These example sentences were originally introduced by linguists to support their respec-
tive claims regarding the di百erencesbetween ～to omou and ～to omotte iru. This study 
will not deal with their di百erences. For further details regarding the di百erences,refer to 
Y okomizo (1997). 
2 Throughout this study, parentheses will be added when the English equivalent of Japa-
nese phrases sounds awkward. 
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Masuoka 1991; Nitta 1991a, b). However, these categorizations are products 
of attempting to classify whole sentences, and therefore are not applicable to 
embedded propositions preceding ～to omou/omotte iru. Here it becomes 
necessary to create a systematic categorization specifically applicable to 
embedded propositions. 
1 Moriya宜na'sStudy of Embedded Propositions plus～to omou3 
To my knowledge, Moriyama’s (1992: 105-16) study is the first attempt to cate問
gorize the content of propositions preceding ～to omou and which investigates 
the influence of such content on the resulting interpretation when ～to omou is 
attached. Moriyama states that the basic function of～to omou is“to indicate 
that the preceding proposition is a speaker’s personal information ”and assumes 
that the increase of subjectivity caused by the attachment of ～.to omou con開
tributes to the decrease of assertiveness. Accordingly, Moriyama claims that 
the function of ～to omou di妊ersdepending upon whether the propositional 
information is‘objective’or‘subjective.叫 Accordingto Moriyama，‘objective’ 
propositional contents report objective facts which a speaker aims to share with 
the hearer as common knowledge. The following sentences are Moriyama’s 
examples of ‘objective’proposition plus～to omou. 
(7) A: A的u,da旬。ku,kiteru hα na? 
Has he come to university? 
B: Haa, kiteru to omoimasu. 
Yeah, I think that he has come. 
( 8) Senpδ初asanji ni kuru to omoimasu. 
I think that the other party will come at 3 o’clock. 
( 9) A: Mono no hon? Dono yo na mono deshita? 
You mean a book about a thing？羽Thatkind of thing was it? 
B: Kyδto no shinise tokαiu taitoru no hon datta to omoimasu. 
I think that it was something like the one titled as Kyoto’s shops 
of old standing. 
(10) Ano atari ni tometαto omou. 
I think I parked it somewhere over there. 
(11) Tashika, sono hi wαNichiyδbi datta to omou. 
If I am correct, I think that that day was Sunday. 
(12) Kono ji, nan to yomu to omou? 
What do you think is the reading of this kanji? 
According to Moriyama, the attachment of ～to omou to the ‘objective’infor-
mation leads to increase the subjectivity of the whole sentence and contributes 
to a speaker’S indication of “This is my personal belief although it should be 
treated as a fact.” 
3 Moriyama does not deal with ～to omotte iru. 
4 Single quotation marks are used to indicate that the quoted words are used within 
Moriyama’s definitions. 
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Moriyama also states that‘subjective’propositional contents express the 
speaker’s subjective mental activity and that the speaker does not aim at 
sharing the ‘subjective’information with the hearer. The following sentences 
are Moriyama’s examples of ‘subjective’propositional contents plus～to omou. 
(13) (In a heavy rain) Ne, g，αkkδkyδmo yαru to omou: 
Hey, do you think that school is open today? 
(14) Nihon no ima no iryδseido wa machigatte iru to omou. 
I think that the current medical system in Japan is not good. 
(15) Sengo no tadashiz・kyδ1・kuo uketα初akamononi tadashii handan o shite 
morawanebαnaranai to omoimasu. 
I think that we have to let the young people who received proper post四
war education make a correct judgment. 
(16) Kore dake oishii mono ga staa ni narenaz・hazuwαnai to omou. 
I think that there is no reason for a delicious thing like this to not be a 
popular food. 
(17) I nasaku nokδbunkαga teichaku shita igo ni, haruαki ga daihyoteki 
kisetsugo to natta no daro to omoimasu. 
I think that spring and autumn became typical words of the seasons 
after the culture of rice growing agriculture had become established. 
(18) Kanpai shitαi toomoimαSU. 
(I thinlζ） I want to give a toast. 
(19) Dδka kongo mo suenagaku goshuJ・仇 to tomo ni toten no shδhin tesuto o 
tsuzukete itadakitai to omoimasu. 
(I think) I would like you to continue your checking our goods with 
your husband from now on, too. 
Moriyama claims that ～to omou following the ‘subjective’information 
behaves differently from the case of the ‘objective’one. According to 
Moriyama, the attachment of ～to omou to the ‘subjective’information does 
not indicate the lack of the speaker’s conviction. Rather, it has the function of 
enhancing the speaker hood: The information itself is subjective and need not 
to be shared by the hearer. The speaker attaches an additional marker of 
subjectivity （～to omou) in order to emphasize clearly that the embedded propo四
sition is a personal one, and as a result the assertiveness of the whole sentence 
decreases. Thus, Moriyama assumes that the increase of subjectivity contrib-
utes to the decrease of assertiveness. Then, he concludes that the attachment 
of～to omou to the ‘subjective’information frequently occurs in formal situか
tions where a speaker hesitates to assert a personal opinion. 
In addition, Moriyama states that Watαshi wαureshii to omou (I think I am 
glad) is a bit awkward for reporting the speaker’s feeling at the time of 
utterance. Then, Moriyama speculates that the same sentence will become 
natural if it implies the speaker’s guess on an uncertain matter as in Moshi so 
nareba ureshii to omou (I think I will be glad if it becomes so), and concludes 
that ureshii at the time of utterance is not a mental activity of cognition but a 
state of feeling. 
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Although Moriyama’s claim contributes to clarifying the necessity to investi-
gate the types of embedded propositions preceding ～to omou, his claim holds a 
limitation which suggests the necessity of a further investigation regarding the 
categorization of the embedded propositions. Moriyama states that the distinc同
tion between ‘objective’and ‘subjective’can be made mostly by predicates 
and sentence ending forms,5 but at the same time he introduces an ambiguous 
case with the example sentence Burukkunaa wαtensai d，αto omou. (I think 
Bruckner is a genius.) He claims that the proposition becomes ‘subjective’if 
a speaker is a big fan of Bruckner’s symphony, while it becomes ‘objective’if 
the fact that Bruckner is a genius has been widely accepted as a common 
knowledge. Here lies Moriyama's limitation: Since Moriyama utilizes the con-
cepts of ‘objective’／‘subjective，’ which are relative6 and cannot be treated as two 
absolute dichotomous categories in order to divide propositional contents into 
two groups, the categorization of propositional contents itself became relative 
and is heavily dependent on contexts, and accordingly the categorization of 
embedded propositions must be taken case-by-case. Considering these limita回
tions・.of Moriyama’s claim, I conclude that a more systematic and universal cate-
gorization of embedded propositions is needed. 
Belie：官1Jing/W.α鈍~ti’間墨／Feeli悦g
Since embedded propositions preceding ～to omou/omotte iru express a 
speaker’s mental activity, their categorization must lie within the framework of 
how a human being’s mind is related to language. I will argue below that 
embedded propositions can be classified into three categories: Believing，協rant-
ing, and Feeling. This categorization is the product of adopting and modifying 
Searle’s (1983) proposal regarding the categorization of intentional states. 
1 Searle’s Speech Act Theory and Intentionality 
Searle (1979) has proposed in his book Expressionαnd Meaning the classification 
of utterances according to“illocutionary acts, m and it has been summarized by 
Levinson (1983: 240) as follows: 
1. Assertives which commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed 
proposition8 
5 Moriyama does not clearly introduce concrete examples of predicates and sentence ending 
forms which are useful to distinguish ‘objective’and ‘subjective ’information. 
6 According to Lyons (1982: 105），“the distinction between the subjective and the objective 
is gradual, rather than absolute.” 
7 Levinson (1983: 236) introduces the definition of “illocutionary act”by Austin (1962): 
“the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc., in uttering a sentence, by virtue of the 
conversational force associated with it.”This study adopts this definition. 
8 Levinson (1983: 240) uses the term“Representative”which Searle originally used to label 
this category. However, Searle (1979: vii) states that he prefers “Assertives”over 
“Representatives”“since any speech act with a propositional content is in some sense a 
representation.” This paper adopts “Assertives”for this category. 
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2. Directives which are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do 
something 
3. Commissives which commit the speaker to some future course of action 
4. Expressives which express a psychological state 
5. Declarations which e妊ectimmediate changes in the institutional state of 
a百airsand which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions 
In his following book Intentionality (1983), Searle focuses on“an account of 
how the mind/brain relates the organism to reality (p. vii）” and pursues his 
theory of Intentionality.9 Searle (1983: 1) defines“Intentionality”as follows: 
“Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they 
are directed at or about or of objects and state of a百airsin the world.” 
Then, Searle lists the following examples of Intentional states: 
belief, fear, hope, desire, love, hate, aversion, liking, disliking, doubting, 
wondering whether, joy, elation, depression, anxiety, pride, remorse, 
sorrow, grief, guilt, rejoicing, irritation, puzzlement, acceptance, for-
giveness, hostility, a妊ection,expectation, anger, admiration, contempt, 
respect, indignation, intention, wishing, wanting, imagining, fantasy, 
shame, lust, disgust, animosity, terror, pleasure, abhorrence, aspiration, 
amusement, and disappointment (p. 4). 
In exploring his analyses, Searle attempts to clear up the notion of 
representation10 and the role it plays within a theory of mind and language. As 
Liedtke (1990: 202) points out, Sea巾 assumesthat “di妊e民 ntkinds of illocu-
tionary acts can be regarded as di妊erentmodes in which utterances represent 
reality.” As a result, Searle claims the following five basic representational 
modes. 
1. Assertive mode 
2. Directive mode 
3. Commissive mode 
4. Expressive mode 
5. Declarative mode 
However, as Liedtke (1990: 203) points out，“Expressives and Declaratives 
are the categories of illocutionary acts made merely by their communicative 
functions，” and therefore “it is di伍cultto imagine the possibility to explain an 
expressive mode and a declarative mode purely in terms of representational 
semantics without allusion to communicative transactions. ”In order to 
classify representational modes, a classification criterion which is independent 
of a classification of illocutionary acts is needed. Liedtke maintains the use of 
“direction of fit，” which is originally proposed by Searle (1983), as a possible 
criterion of classification. 
9 Searle insists on the consistent use of the capital ‘I’for ‘Intentionality’throughout his 
book. This study follows Searle’s use of Intentionality. 
10 Liedtke (1990: 197) states that Searle conceives “representation”as“the capacity of the 
mind to relate the organism to the world by way of Intentional states.” This paper adopts 
this definition. 
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2 Direction of Fit 
The concept of “direction of fit”was originally introduced in Searle’S Expres-
sionαnd Meaning (1979: 1-27) in the analyses of his speech act theory and has 
been carried over to Intentional states. According to Searle (1983: 7…8), there 
exist three types of direction of fit: mind回to四world,world-to-mind and null 
direction of fit. Each type of direction of fit will be briefly explained below. 
2. 1 Mind回to回初orldDirection of Fit 
孔1ind-to出worlddirection of fit characterizes a representational mode which can 
be true or false. Searle utilizes“beliefs ”as its example and states as follows: 
If my beliefs turn out to be wrong, it is my beliefs and not the world 
which is at fault, as is shown by the fact that I can correct the situation 
simply by changing the belief. . . . Beliefs like statements can be true 
or false, and we might say they have the ”mind田to-world”directionof 
fit (p. 8). 
2. 2 World-to-mind Direction of Fit 
明Torld-to回minddirection of fit characterizes a representational mode whose 
fulfillment is the issue. Searle utilizes“intention ”and “desire ”as its exam悶
ples and states as follows: 
If I fail to carry out my intentions or if my desires are unfulfilled I C組問
not in that way correct the situation by simply changing the intention or 
desire. In these cases it is, so to speak, the fault of the world if it fails 
to match the intention or the desire. . .Desires and intentions ... c柏田
not be true or false, but can be complied with, fulfilled, or carried out, 
and we might say that they have the “world四tomind ”direction of fit 
(p. 8). 
2. 3 Null Direction of Fit 
Null direction of fit characterizes a representational mode whose propositional 
content is neither true回orイalsenor fulfillment. In other words, Searle uses the 
term “null ”as an additional category of representational mode which cannot 
be explained well by either mind-to-world or world-to-mind direction of fit. 
Searle utilizes“sorrow”and “please ”as its examples and states as follows: 
If I am sorry that I insulted you or pleased that you won the prize, then, 
though my sorrow contains a belief that I insulted you and a wish that I 
hadn’t insulted you and my pleasure contains a belief that you won the 
prize and a wish that you won the prize, my sorrow and pleasure can’t 
be true or false in the way that my beliefs can, nor fulfilled in the way 
my desires can. My sorrow and pleasure may be appropriate or inappro田
priate depending on whether or not the mind-to-world direction of fit of 
the belief is really satisfied, but my sorrow and pleasure don’t in that 
way have any direction of fit (pp. 8-9). 
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3 Direction of Fit and Representational品質odes
I argue that these three types of direction of fit contribute to classifying repre開
sentational modes of intentional states into three categories.11 
Group I: Mind-to-world direction of fit 
This category is identical to Searle's assertive mode (1983: 7), which includes 
“feeling certain, having a hunch, supposing, and many other degrees of convic-
tion”（1983: 29). 
Group II ：明Torld-to-mind direction of fit 
This category includes“wanting, wishing, lusting, hankering after and many 
other degrees of desire”（1983: 29). Searle’s directive mode and commissive 
mode belong to this category. 
Regarding the categories of Groups I and II above, as Searle (1983 : 30) 
states, traditional philosophers label them cognition and volition. I would like 
to utilize the terms Believing and Wa仰勾 forthis study following Grice (1973) 
who suggests the possibility to treat them as two primitive propositional 
attitudes. 
Group III: Null direction of fit 
The propositional content of this category is neither true-oトfalsenor fulfilled or 
not. Representational mode of this category is to simply express the relevant 
psychological state of the speaker. This category includes Searle’s expressive 
mode.12 
I label Group III as Feeling. 
As a result, the following categories of representational modes can be made 
according to their direction of fit as shown in Figure 1. 
Representational孔1ode
Believing 
時7anting
Feeling 
Direction of Fit 
Mind同to-world
World-to-mind 
Null 
Fig. 1 Three Representational Modes and Direction of Fit 
The example sentences for each category are as follows: 
Believing 
(20) Jon ga hannin da. John is the culprit. 
(21) An wαshojiki dα. Ann is honest. 
日7αηtiηg
(22) Fukuoka e kaeritai. I want to go back to Fukuoka. 
（ユ3〕 Aηαtαηikite hoshii. I want you to come. 
Feeling 
1 Liedtke (1990: 207-8) does not include the use of null direction of fit as a criterion of repre聞
sentational modes. On the other hand, I utilize al three types of direction of fit. 
12 Liedtke (1990: 204) claims that“declarations have to be taken into consideration within a 
taxonomy of communicative acts; but they must be left out if one wants to develop a tax-
onomy of representational modes." This study follows Liedtke’s claim. 
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(24) Ureshii. 
(25) Sabishii. 
???????????????????
4 Attachment of～to omou/omotおかM to Three Types of Representational 
五夜odes
I here argue that the fundamental function of ～to omou/omotte iru is“to 
decrease the speaker's either commitment to or involvement in the proposi叩
tional contents，” and that the selection between “commitment”or“involve同
ment”is determined by the representational mode of the proposition. Stubbs 
(1986) points out that a speaker expresses di百erentdegrees of commitment to 
and detachment from the proposition by selecting how he expresses it. He 
states that “the expression of commitment and detachment ... can be seen as a 
central organizing principle in language (p. 4）.” According to Stubbs，“com-
mitment has to do with whether a proposition is presented as true, false, self由
evident, a matter of objective fact or of personal opinion, shared knowledge, 
taken for granted or debatable, controversial, precise or vague, contradictory 
to what others have said, and so on (p. 8）.” This study will use the term 
“commitment ”following Stubbs’s definition. Also, regarding the term 
“involvement，” Makino (1994) defines it as“a state of being fully engaged with 
the topic and the interlocutor.” In this study, I define“involvement”as“an 
affective state of mind being engaged with representational mode.” 
The function of～to omou/011叫 teiru will be discussed below in terms of 
each representational mode, namely, Believing, Wanting, and Feeling. 
4. 1 ～to omou/omotte iγuαηd Believing 
Several scholars (e.g., Nakau 1979; Kamio 1990; Masuoka 1991; Iwasaki 
1993; Sawada 1993) have pointed out that ～to omou/omotte iru is an expres帥
sion of epistemic modality.14 For example, Nakau (1979) introduces the 
13 It is important to state here that sentences ending in the perfective form of the verb～ta 
are categorized into Believing. As Moriyama (1988: 235) maintains, when a speaker de-
scribes an event with ～tαform, he reports the“fact ”that the event occurred at a time in 
the past. In other words, a speaker’s utterance indicates his belief regarding the occur-
rence of the event in the past. Examine the following sentences: 
(20') Jon ga hannin datta. (I believe the fact that) John was the culprit. 
(22') Fukuoka e kaeritakatta. (I believe the fact that) I wanted to go back to 
Fukuoka. 
(24') Ureshikatta. (I believe the fact that) I was glad. 
Thus, sentences ending in ～ta form are categorized into Believing. 
14 This study adopts Lyons’s (1977: 452) definition of “modality ”： Modality is “the speaker’s 
opinion or attitude towards the proposition that the sentence expresses or the situation 
that proposition describes.” According to Lyons, modality can be divided into two types: 
epistemic modality and deontic modality. “Epistemic modality is concerned with matters 
of knowledge, belief (p. 793) or opinion rather than fact (pp. 681-82）.” Palmer (1986: 51) 
claims that epistemic modality is to be interpreted as“the degree of commitment by the 
speaker to what he says”or“the status of the speaker’s understanding or knowledge”in 
relation to proposition. On the other hand, deontic modality is concerned with the neces幽
sity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents (Lyons 1977: 823). 
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sentence，砂Tatαshiwa An o shojiki da to omou (I think that Ann is honest) and 
claims that both omou and its English equivalent “I think”are expressions of 
epistemic modality. 
Regarding the speaker’s motivation to attach “I think (that）” to the pro-
position, Lyons (1977: 738) refers to Urmsor山（1952)proposal：“to modify or 
weaken the claim to truth that would be implied by a simple assertion.” In 
other words，“I think”is attached in order to“release speakers from total com-
mitment to propositions (Stubbs 1986: 18），” or to “indicate the level or lack of 
speaker’s confidence in the truth of the relevant proposition (Maynard 1993: 
53）.” Similarly, Masuoka (1991: 112) states that～to omou is attached to the 
proposition since the speaker hesitates to make his judgment of the truth by 
simply presenting the proposition by itself. Kamio (1990: 235), within his own 
theoretical framework called “territory of information，”15 maintains that the 
attachment of～to omou ／“I think" is a type of communication strategy in 
which the speaker softens the utterance by intentionally selecting an“indirect 
form”（i.e., utterance with ～to omou ／“I think”） instead of a“direct form " 
(i.e., utterance without ～to omou ／“I think”）， even though the information is 
within the speaker’s own territory. Kamio points out that directly expressing 
information within the speaker’s territory results in not only emphasizing 
ownership of the information, but also emphasizing the information as not 
belonging within the hearer’s territory, and therefore the speaker purposely 
selects an indirect form. Thus, like “I think，”～to omou is used to decrease 
the speaker’s commitment to propositions. 
Nakau (1979), Masuoka (1991), Iwasaki (1993) and Sawada (1993)16 agree with 
the claim that～to omou/omotte iru is an epistemic modal marker, and their 
analyses are limited to the case of Believ 
ine the following examples: 
N akau (1979) 
( 4) Watashi卸αAno shojiki da to omou/omotte iru. 
I think/(am thinking) that Ann is honest. 
Masuoka (1991) 
(26) Boku no kangae da to, kimi wαkofuku sugiru no da to omou ne. 
In my opinion, I think you are too happy. 
Iwαsaki (1993) 
( 6) Boku wαzettai ni Jon ga hαnnin da to omou. 
I positively think that John is the culprit. 
Sawad，α(1993) 
(27) A: Watashi wa [Tomu ga shinhannin da to] omou. 
I think Tom isthe real culprit. 
15 For details, refer to Kamio (1990). 
16 Nakau (1979) and Sawada (1993) agree that omotte iru cannot function as an epistemic 
modal expression. Their claim will not be considered further since it is beyond the scope 
of this study and this study has defined modality in a broader sense according to Lyons 
(1977). 
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B: Hantδdesu ka? 
Is it true that Tom isthe real culprit? 
(28) A: Watαshi旬。 （imade mo) [Tomu ga shinhannin da to] omotte iru. 
I (stil) think Tom isthe real culprit. 
B: Hontδdesu hαF 
Is it true that you think that Tom isthe real culprit? 
Thus, the representational mode of embedded propositions of al the exam-
ples above belongs to Believing; and therefore the validity of their claims is 
limited to the case of Believing: in the case of Bel的J仇g，～toomo1ゆmotteiru 
functions as an epistemic modality marker which decreases the speaker’s com-
mitment to the truth of embedded propositions. 
4.2 ～to omou/omotte iru and Wanting 
The attachment of～to omo伽 7附 e山 tothe representational mode of Want-
ing has not received much attention by scholars when compared to the case of 
Believing. I mentioned that in the case of Believing, the issue is how much 
conviction a speaker holds, namely, how sure he is about the truth of the 
embedded proposition. I argue here that the attachment of ～to omou/omotte 
iru to Wanting has the function of decreasing the degree of the speaker’s 
involvement in the propositional contents. In the case of Wanting, proposition 
is not true回or-falsebut fulfilled-or-unfulfilled. Accordingly, the issue is how 
much determination a speaker holds, namely, how serious he is toward the 
fulfillment of his desires, intentions, hopes, wishes, etc. 
4. 3 ～to om仰motteかuαndFeeling 
I acknowledge the plausibility to treat Feeling plus ～to omou/omotte iru in the 
similar manner as in the C蹴 ofWanting plus ～to omo仰 7叫 teiru since the 
representational modes of both W仰 tingand Feeling are not true聞or-false.
Accordingly, I argue that the attachment of ～to omou/omotte iru decreases the 
speaker’s involvement in the propositional contents. However, there exists a 
difference between Wanting and Feeling regarding how a speaker's mental 
activity influences his world. Unlike Wanting which has world-to悶minddirec-
tion of fit, Feeling has null direction of fit. As a result, in the case of Feeling, 
the issue is not how much determination a speaker holds, namely, how serious 
he is toward the fulfillment of his desires, intentions, hopes, wishes, etc. 
Rather, the issue is the degree of involvement a speaker includes in a state of 
feeling which the propositional contents express. 
The preceding discussion can be summarized as follows: 
A. Embedded propositions preceding ～to omou/omotte iru are categorized 
into three types of representational modes according to their direction of 
fit. 
1. Believing：孔1ind-to-worlddirection of fit 
2. Wanting: World-to-mind direction of fit 
3. Feeling: Null direction of fit 
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B. The basic function of ～to omou/omotte iru is to decrease either the 
speaker's commitment to or involvement in the propositional contents of 
embedded clauses. 
C. Whether the function of ～to omoiゆmatteiru is the commitment to or 
involvement in the propositional contents is determined by the represen由
tational mode of the propositions. 
1. Believing: To decrease the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the 
propositions. 
2. Wanting: To decrease the speaker’s involvement in the propositions. 
(The degree of the speaker’s determination towards fulfillment is the 
issue.) 
3. Feeling: To decrease the speaker’s involvement in the propositions. 
(The degree of the speaker’s involvement included in a state of feel回
ing is the issue.) 
In the following sections I will introduce linguistic phenomena which are 
explainable within the framework of the categorization of the three representa-
tional modes: (1) a categorization of verbs of mental activity and (2) similarities 
and differences between the attachment of～to h仰 gaeru/omou/kanjiru.
In Japanese, there exist verbs of mental activity other than omou. They can be 
classified according to (1) the possibility to be attached to“a proposition plus 
to”and (2) their relationship with representational modes. Forty-four “basic” 
verbs of mental activity have been chosen from Nihongo kihon doshi yoho jiten 
(Kojima et al. 1989), which introduces 728 verbs as basic verbs in Japanese. 
Among them, verbs of mental activity which generally occur after “a proposi-
tion plus to”are as follows: 17 
1. inoru, to wish, hope (in mind) 
2. utag，αu, to doubt 
3. omou, to think 
4. kaishaku問suru,to interpret 
5. kangaeru, to think 
6. kanjiru, to feel 
7. kanshin-suru, to be impressed 
8. ki初回suru,to hope, wish 
9. kesshzかsuru,to decide, determine 
10. gokai-suru, to misunderstand 
11. shinjiru, to believe 
12. shinpai-suru, to worry 
17 Kojima et al. (1989) introduce sentence patterns in which each verb is used generally in a 
daily life. I will use sentence patterns they introduce as the guideline to determine if 
verbs are generally used after “a proposition plus to.” 
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13. sδ泌四suru,to imagine 
14. negau, to wish, desire 
15. nozomu, to wish, want 
16. handan-suru, to judge 
17. mayou, to be at a loss 
18. mitomeru, to recognize, acknowledge, agree 
19. rikai問suru,to understand 
20. wαkaru, to know, understand 
I will further investigate these 20 verbs of mental activity, which are gen-
erall y used after “a proposition plus to，” as possible candidates to be used as 
modal phrases like omou since their categorization can be made according to the 
types of representational modes of embedded clauses. 
1 Verbs of Mental Activity and 
It has been pointed out that～to omou/omotte iru can be attached to both types 
of representational modes (namely, Believing and Wantz勾）.18 Examination on 
whether the 20 verbs of mental activity can be attached to both types of rep代田
sentational modes or to only one type enables me to classify the verbs into three 
groups as shown below. I label the three groups as General verbs of mental 
activity, Believing-specific verbs of mental activity, and Wanting-specific verbs 
of mental activity, respectively. 
General verbs of mental activity: verbs which can be normally attached to 
both types of representational modes （倒的ingand Wanting) 
1. omou, to think 
2. kangaeru, to think 
3. kanjiru, to feel 
Bel ieving-speczヌcverbs of mental activity: verbs which can be normally 
attached only to Believing 
1. utagau, to doubt 
2. kaishaku悶suru,to interpret 
3. kanshzかsuru,to be impressed 
4. gokai四suru,to misunderstand 
5. shinjiru, to believe 
6. shinpai-suru, to worry 
7. sδzo-suru, to imagine 
8. handan-suru, to judge 
9. mαyou, to be at a loss 
10. mitomeru, to recognize, acknowledge, agree 
11. rikai-suru, to understand 
12. wαkaru, to know, understand 
18 The attachment of omou/omotte什uto Feeli1 is possible but limited. Therefore, the cri-
terion of whether or not verbs can be attached to Feeling is excluded. 
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防7anting-specificverbs of mental activity: verbs which can be normally 
attached only to 砂＇anting
1. inoru, to wish, hope (in mind) 
2. kesshin回suru,to decide, determine 
3. kibδ悶suru,to hope, wish 
4. negau, to wish, desire 
5. nozomu, to wish, want 
Both Believing-specific and Wanting叩specificverbs of mental activity will be 
investigated below first, and General verbs of mental activity will be discussed 
in detail later. 
2 Believi拘g固speci飽cVerbs and Wa拘ting固specificVerbs of 1¥査e:ntal
Although selected as candidates for verbs to be used in modal phrases, both 
Believing-specific and Wanting-specific verbs of mental activity are not able to 
function as a part of a modal phrase even if they are preceded by their specific 
representational mode. Each verb implies its specific mental activity, and 
therefore its attachment to a proposition emphasizes the existence of its specific 
mental activity rather than indicating the degree of the speaker’s commitment 
or involvement. As a result，“a proposition plus to+a verb”functions as“I 
have a specific mental activity indicator，＇’ and each activity is as follows: 
Believing-specific切 γbsof mentalαcti悦ty:
1. ～to utagau, I have a doubt indicator 
2. ～to kaishaku-suru, I have an interpretation indicator 
3. ～to hαnshi1 
4. ～to gokαi-suru, I have a misunderstanding indicator 
5. ～to shiηijiru, I have a belief indicator 
6. ～to shinpai由suru,I have a worry indicator 
7. ～to sδ泌田suru,I have an imagination indicator 
8. ～to handan-suru, I have a judgment indicator 
9. ～to mayou, I have a confusion indicator 
10. ～to mitomeru, I have an agreement indicator 
1. ～to rikai-suru, I have an understanding indicator 
12. ～to wakaru, I have an understanding indicator 
Wiαηting-specific切 γbs:
1. ～to inoru, I have a wish indicator 
2. ～to kesshzかsuru,I have a determination indicator 
3. ～to kz初回suru,I have a hope indicator 
4. ～to negau, I have a wish indicator 
5. ～to nozomu, I have a hope indicator 
Interestingly, the simple present tense of these verbs does not imply a state of 
mental activity. Rather, it sounds as if the speaker declares to start a specific 
mental activity at the time of the utterance. For example, 
(29) wαtαshi切αTanakα－sαηgαh倒的ηjα naito shinjimαSU. 
I am now starting to believe that Mr. Tanaka is not the culprit. 
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(30) Wiαtαshi切αTokyoηiikitαi toηeg，α：imαSU. 
I now announce my desire to go to Tokyo. 
In order to imply a state of mental activity, the present progressive form 
should be used as follows: 
(29＇〕 Wαtαshi wαTαηαhα回Sαηgαhαη旬開jαηαi to shinfite imαSU. 
I believe that Mr. Tanaka is not the culprit. 。0＇〕 WαtαshiwαTokyoηi ikitαi toηeg，αte imαSU. 
I wish to go to Tokyo. 
This phenomenon indicates that both Believing-specific and Wanting-specific 
verbs are ［十resultative]19 as other verbs of norトmentalactivity, such as iku 
(go) and kaeru (return home). Interestingly, this phenomenon is limited to 
［十volitional]verbs and does not occur in the case of [ -volitional] verbs. This 
is because “declaration ”of starting a mental activity requires the speaker's voli-
tion. According to Kojima et al. (1989), among Believing-specific and Wanting-
specific verbs of mental activity, kαnshin-suru (to be impressed), gokai-suru (to 
misunderstand), mayou (to be at a loss), and wakαru (to know, understand) are 
[ -volitional]. Examine the following example sentences: 
(31) H"αtαshi切αTαηαhα－sαηgαhαη切れ dα togokα：i-suru. 
I (will) misunderstand that Mr. Tanaka is the culprit. 
(31＇〕 WαtαshiwαTαnakα四Sαηgαhαη切符 dα togokαi shite iru. 
I have misunderstood that Mr. Tanal王ais the culprit. 
Sentence (31) indicates the speaker’s prediction of the occurrence of his 
misunderstanding in his imaginary future, while sentence (31') indicates the 
existence of his misunderstanding from before until the time of utterance. 
This holds true in the cases of hαnshin-suru and mayou, too. However, 
19 The meaning of te-iru has been examined by many researchers ever since Kindaichi’s 
1950 article entitled “A classification of Japanese verbs (kokugo dos hi no ichi-bunseki）.” 
Kindaichi (1976) divides verbs into four categories, according to whether a verb can, 
must or cannot co蜘occurwith te回iru,and what meaning the verbal phrase takes when it 
occurs: ]otai Doshi (Stative Verbs), Keizoku Doshi (Continuative Verbs), Shunkan Dδshi 
(Instantaneous Verbs) and Daかonshuno Dδshi (Type Four Verbs). Kindaichi’s work has 
been followed and modified by Fujii (1976). F可iproposes a distinction between result 
and norトresultfor both continuative and instantaneous verbs. Fujii regards result verbs 
as verbs which indicate animate/inanimate movement that later brings a certain result. 
He claims that it is necessary to set up a distinction between result and non-result verbs 
crosscutting the one between continuative and instantaneous verbs. Consequently, the 
following four categories can be made and examples are given. 
A. Continuative-Result Verbs (ochiru "fall，”kiru“put on，” iku“go，” kuru“come”） 
B. Instantaneous-Result Verbs (kekkon-suru“marry，”的chakuィuru“arrive，”。waru
“end，”shagamu“crouch, squat”） 
C. Continuative回Non-resultverbs (yomu“read，” kaku“write，” kiku“listen，” utau 
“sing ”） 
D. Instantaneous-Non-result verbs (shiriau“get acquainted，” mokugeki四suru“wit-
ness，”sogu-suru“encounter”） 
F吋iclaims that it is not instantaneous verbs, but the result verbs (A and B above) whose 
te-iru form indicates the state as a result of an already completed event. This study 
adopts Fujii’s claim and utilizes the term [ + resultative] to explain a phenomenon of 
Believing-specific and Wanting欄specificverbs. 
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wakaru indicates the existence of the speaker’s understanding at the time of 
utterance by both the simple present tense form and the present progressive 
form. For example, 
(32＇〕 Wαtαsh£ 切αTαηぬかSαηgαhαn£ηjαηαito切α：karu.
I know that Mr. Tanaka is not the culprit. 
(32＇〕 Wαtαsh£ 切αTαηαhα－sαηgα hann£njαna£ to切αhαte£ru. 
I know that Mr. Tanaka is not the culprit. 
This phenomenon appears to suggest the plausibility to treat wαhαru as 
[ +volitional] contrary to the claim of Kojima et al. 
3 GenerαZ Verbs of Mental Activity: 
Kangaeru, omou, and kanj£ru have been grouped together in the category of 
General verbs of mental activity according to the fact that they can be attached 
to propositional contents of both Bel£ev£ng and Want£ng. There exist similari同
ties and differences between the attachment of ～to kangaeru/omou/kanj£ru. 
The similarities and di百erenceswill be discussed below respectively. 
3. 1 S£m£lαγ£t£es betzβeen～to hαηgαeγu/omou/kαη，j£ru 
Unlike the case of Bel£ev£ng-specifi.c and Wanting四specificverbs of mental 
activity, both the single present tense form and the present progressive form of 
General verbs of mental activity express a state of mental activity; and like～to 
omou, the attachment of～to kangaeru and ～to kanjiru functions to decrease 
the degree of a speaker’s commitment to/involvement in propositional contents. 
For example, 
Believing 
Jon gα hannin dαto kang，αeru/kang，αete iγu. 
Jon gαhαnnin d，αto omou/o悦otteiγ仏
Jon gαhαnniηdα to hαnjiγ叫hαnjiteiγ仏
I think/feel (am thinking/am feeling) that John is the culprit. 
w.αnting 
Tokyoηi ikitαi to hαηgαeγu/kαηgα：ete iγ仏
Tokyo ni iki tαi to omou/omotte iγ仏
Tokyoηt ikitαi to hαnjiγu/kαnjite iγ仏
(I think/feel/am thinki時／amfeeling that) I want to go to Tokyo. 
3. 2 Diffeγ伺 cesof kαηgαeγu/Omou/K，αη'iγu 
Several linguists (e.g., Nagashima 1979; Kojima et al. 1989; Iwasaki 1993) 
have investigated the differences of kangaeru, omou, and hαnjiru. According 
to N agashima, kangaeru is“logical and processed ”and omou is“intuitive 
and emotive" (pp. 104-12). Iwasaki maintains that the di百erencebetween 
kangaeru and omou lies “in the degree of a cognizer’s intention or initiative in 
the thought process”and adds that “初ngaerurepresents a deliberate mental 
process while omou represents a spontaneous thinki時 process( something close 
to“feel”in English) (p. 69）.” Kojima et al. interpret kanjiru as“to hold a cer-
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tain feeling in one's heart toward a person or thing (p. 153）プ20 Morita (1977: 
139-41) points out that omou covers a wide range of mental activity from hold問
ing a feeling in heart (affect-oriented mental activity) to using one’s intellect 
(cognitiorトorientedmental activity) and illustrates the relationship among 
kangaeru, omou, and kanjz'ru as in Figure 2: 
十一 一十
Kanjiru 
十一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一 一一一一十
Omou 
＋ 一一 一一 十
Kangaeru 
Fig. 2 Morita's Kαng，αeru/Om ,)K，αη1jiri J, 
This relationship can be combined with the cognith叫a古ectiveorientation as 
in Figure 3: 
十一一 一十
Kαηjiru 
＋一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一 一一一十
Omou 
十 一一 一ー十
Kαng，αeru 
Cognition －一一 一一一一 一一一一一 一一一 一一A首ect
Fig. 3 Cognitive/A荘ectiveOrientation of Generαf Verbs of Mental Activity 
The cognitive/a妊ectiveorientation of the three representational modes can be 
illustrated as in Figure 4: 
Fig. 4 Cognitive/A宜ectiveOrientation of Three Representational Modes 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 can be united together and is illustrated in Figure 5. 
十一一 一十
Kαηjiγu 
十一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一 一一一一一一十
Omou 
＋ 一十
Kang，αeru 
Cognition －－－一一一一一一 一一一一一 一一一一一 一 -A妊ect
Believing Wiαnting Feeling 
Fig. 5 Cognitive/A百ectiveOrientation of Three Representational 
Modes and General Verbs of Mental Activity 
20 The original sentence written in Japanese is Hito ya kotogara ni tsuite kokoro ni aru shu no 
kimochi o idaku. I translated kokoro into “heart ”and kimochi into “feeling.” 
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As Figure 5 indicates, omou does not have the same degree of cognitive orien由
tation as hαngaeru since omou does not refer to logical and deliberate cognitive 
processing. Therefore, by attaching kangaeru instead of omou to a thought 
which a propositional content expresses, the speaker can indicate that the 
thought is logical and deliberate. On the other hand, Figure 5 shows that 
kanjiru has a strong affective orientation and is located at the opposite side of 
kangaeru. This implies that 初旬irudoes not refer to cognitive processing 
whether or not it is logical/deliberate. Therefore, by attaching kanjiru instead 
of omo民 thespeaker can emphasize that the thought is not the result of one’s 
cognition and that it simply exists as a state of feeling at the time of utterance. 
Modes pl阻S～to
The combinations of kangaeru with the three representational modes and that 
of kanfiru will be investigated below. 
1 Believiηg plus kα拘gαeru
The attachment of kangaeru to Believing functions to decrease the degree of a 
speaker’s commitment to his belief with a connotation of“this belief is the prod・欄
uct of logical process of cognition.” Examine the following example sentences 
extracted from N agashima (1979: 111): 
(33) Ashita wa ame da to omoimasu. 
I think that it will rain tomorrow. 
(34) Ashita wαame da to h仰 gaemasu.
I think that it will rain tomorrow. 
N agashima points out that sentence (34) is appropriate when the speaker is a 
weather reporter who utters based upon reference to data such as a weather 
map, and adds that a weather reporter who utters sentence (33) will be consid-
ered unreliable. Thus, the attachment of kang，αeru to Believz勾 emphasizes
that the speaker’s belief is the result of cognitive mental activity which is logical 
and deliberate. 
2 Wα倒的gplus K，αngαeru 
The attachment of kangaeru to跨Tantingimplies that the desires, intentions, 
etc., are the result of cognitive processing. Examine the following example sen回
tences extracted from Iwasaki (1993: 69) :21 
(35) Baku mo shino to omou. 
I think (am thinking) that I will kil myself. 
(36) Baku mo shino to kangaeru. 
I think (am thinking) that I will kil myself. 
21 Iwasaki’s original sentences are in the past tense as follows: 
(35') Boku mo shinδto omotta. I thought I would kil myself. 
(36') Boku mo shinδto kangaeta. I thought I would kil myself. 
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Iwasaki points out that sentence (35) is "a statement said out of desperation” 
and sentence (36) is“a statement which results from some careful thinki時．”
Thus, the attachment of kangaeru to Wanting functions to indicate that the 
desires, intentions, etc., are the result of logical and deliberate thinking. 
3 Feeling plus kαηgαeru 
Kangaeru is incompatible with Feeling due to the semantic contradiction be-
tween propositional contents of Feeling and kangaer仏 Nagashima (1979 : 108) 
introduces the following example sentences: 
(37) *Kuyashii to kangaeru. I think I am regretful. 
(38）マtaito kangaeru. I thi 
I previously stated that omou can be attached to Feeling and that its attach-
ment functions to objectify one's subjective mental activity and creates the 
nuance of“This is what I feel if I report what I see inside of me objectively.” 
The attachment of omou to Feeling is possible since omou has an affective 
orientation. On the other hand, kang，αeru has a stronger degree of cognitive 
orientation, and therefore its attachment to Feeling leads to emphasize that the 
propositional contents of Feeling are the result of logical and deliberate think-
ing. However, Feeling refers to a state of feeling which exists spontaneously 
within the speaker at the time of utterance. This spontaneity and simultaneity 
makes Feeling unable to co回occurwith kangaeru which refers to logical process-
ing in mind. 
4 Believing 
As in the case of Feeling plus kangaeru, the semantic contradiction between the 
propositional contents of Believing and kanjiru is expected to lead to the incom-
patibility between them. However in fact, unlike Feeling plus kang，αeru, 
kanjiru frequently co-occurs with Believing as shown in the following example 
sentences introduced by Kojima et al. (1989: 153) :22 
(39) Y appari sensei wa erai to kanjiru. 
After al, I feel (am feeling) that the teacher is someone to look up to. 
( 40) Watashi wa kare gα watashi ni urami o matte iru to kanjiru. 
I feel (am feeling) that he holds a grudge against me. 
When kanjiru is attached to Believing, it functions to imply that the speaker’s 
belief is not the result of cognitive processing but rather intuitional. Examine 
the following example sentences: 
( 41) Tanaka-san wαkitto kuru to omou. 
I think that Mr. Tanaka will surely come. 
(42) Tanαka-sαn wa kitto kuru to kanjiru. 
22 Original example sentences by 五ojimaet al. are in the past tense as follows: 
〔39＇〕 Yαpparisensei叩αerαito hαnjitα． 
After al, I felt that the teacher was someone to look up to. 
(40＇〕 Wαtashi切α初 γegα 四αtashi的 wαmio matte iru to hαnjitα． 
I felt thαt he held αgrudgeαgαinst me. 
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I feel that Mr. Tanaka will surely come. 
In the case of sentence ( 41), the speaker’s belief about Tanaka’s coming may 
be based on some evidence which supports his belief (e.g・， the speaker 
witnessed Tanaka’s buying a ticket to the place where sentence (41) is uttered) 
or may be purely intuitional. In other words, in the case of Believing plus 
omou, the belief may be the result of cognitive processing or of intuition. On 
the other hand, the interpretation of sentence ( 42) is limited to that of the 
speaker’s intuitional belief：“This is what I believe because I feel so now.” If 
a belief does not have any evidentiary justification which supports it and is 
purely intuitional, the degree of the speaker's commitment to the belief, 
namely, how much conviction he holds, is expected to be smaller. This is 
because, as Giv6n (1982: 46) states，“Evidentiality is the source of certai剖 y.”
Therefore, it can be concluded that when hαnjiru is attached to Believing, the 
decrease in the degree of a speaker’s commitment to propositional contents 
becomes larger than in the case of Believing plus omou. 
5 
The attachment of kanj£ru to Wanting implies that the desires, intentions, etc., 
are not the result of cognitive processing but of momentary thinking. Exam-
ine the following example sentences: 
(43) Hayaku sotsugyδshitai to omoimasu. 
(I think that) I want to graduate soon. 
( 44) H ayaku sotsugyδshitai to kanjimasu. 
(I feel that) I want to graduate soon. 
In the case of sentence (43), the speaker's desire to graduate soon may be 
based on his cognitive processing (e.g., considering benefits that may be 
received from early graduation such as a long vacation or a better salary) or 
possibly of pure momentary thinking. In other words, in the case of Wanting 
plus omou, desires may be the result of cognitive processing or of what occurred 
to the speaker momentarily. If a person utilizes his cognition in the process of 
establishing his desires, it is expected that his involvement in his desires is deep 
since he has been engaged in them until the time of utterance and has become 
more or less determined to fulfill them. On the other hand, if desires are 
momentary, the speaker’s determination to fulfill them is expected to be smaller 
since the desires just occurred to him. The interpretation of sentence ( 44 ),
namely, Wantz勾 pluskanjiru, is limited to that of the speaker’s momentary 
desire：“This is what I want to do because I feel so now.” Thus, omou can 
indicate that the desires are either the result of cognitive processing or of 
momentary thinking, and as a result, omou can indicate the speaker’s larger or 
smaller degree of determination to fulfill them while kanjiru can indicate only 
the smaller one. Therefore, it can be concluded that when hαnjiru is attached 
to Wanting, the decrease in the degree of a speaker’s involvement in the 
propositional contents becomes larger than in the case of Wanting plus omou. 
The validity of this claim is supported by the following example sentences: 
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(45) Hayaku sotsugyδshiyδto omoimasu. 
(I think that) I intend to graduate soon. 
( 46) ? ? Hayaku sotsugyδshiyδto h仰 ，jimasu.
(I feel that) I intend to graduate soon. 
Sentence (46) is semantically awkward. This is because, unlike～tai which 
simply expresses the speaker's desire，～（y）δimplies that the speaker confines 
himself to acting. In other words，～（y）δis the expression of the speaker’s 
determination about his actions. In order to determine one's action, cognitive 
processing is required. Therefore，～（y）δis incompatible with kanjiru which 
does not refer to cognitive processing. 
6 Feeling 
A state of feeling expressed in utterances of Feeling belongs only to the speaker, 
and the hearer accepts the expressed feeling of the speaker as the way it is 
expressed. In this manner, the speaker is released from the necessity of consid回
eration to decrease the degree of his involvement in propositional contents of 
Feeling, and as a result, the speaker does not have much motivation to decrease 
it. As in the case of Feeling plus omou, kanjiru can be attached to proposi-
tional contents of Feeling, and its attachment functions to decrease the degree 
of the speaker’s involvement in his personal feelings. However, there exists a 
difference between omou and kanjiru regarding the objectification of proposト
tional contents. As stated before, when omou is attached to Feeling, the whole 
sentence becomes “objectified”and sounds like a belief on his own feeling from 
the other party’s viewpoint. This objectifying function of omou is attributable 
to the fact that omou has a cognitive orientation since recognizing one’s own 
feelings objectively is a cognitive processing. Kanjiru does not have a cogni回
tive orientation, and therefore its attachment does not objectify propositional 
contents in the same manner as omou does. Examine the following sentences 
introduced by Morita (1977: 141): 
( 47) ? Itai to omou. 23 I think I am painful. 
(48) ? Itai to kanjiru. I am painful. 
According to Morita, sentence ( 48) indicates the speaker’s realization of pain 
caused by some stimulus, while sentence ( 4 7)is the expression of indirect recog-
nition of pain in which he once accepts the pain at heart and gives his judgment 
on it. Thus, the degree of objectification differs between omou and kanjiru: 
The attachment of omou objectifies propositional contents to a greater degree 
than the one of kanjiru due to the cognitive orientation of omou. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I have attempted to search for a systematic categorization of 
23 Question mad王isadded to example sentences ( 4 7)and ( 48) since Moriyama (1992) states 
they are“a bit awkward”sentences. 
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embedded clauses preceding ～to omou/omotte iru. Based upon my proposed 
categories, namely Believing, Wanting, and Feeling, I expanded my discussion 
to the categorization of verbs of mental activity and to the examination of simi-
larities and differences between the attachme剖 of～to kangaeru/omou/kanjiru. 
This study also suggests a specific future study: It has been pointed out that 
Feeling and kangaeru are incompatible, but Belzれ；ingcan co悶occurwith kanjiru. 
That is, although both combinations have a semantic contradiction between 
propositional content and verb, only Believing and kanjiru are compatible. 
The mechanism which enables Believing and kanjiru to co-occur awaits 
discovery. 
I have maintained, in this study, the importance of taking into consideration 
three types of representational modes of propositional contents in order to grasp 
the global function of the attachment of ～to omou/omotte ir仏 Althoughthere 
are many other devices for the speaker to reflect his mind in language, and the 
use of omou/omotte iru is only one of them, I believe that the findings of this 
study have revealed that the three representational modes can contribute to 
deepening the understanding of how language reflects on a human being’s 
mind. The applicability of the three representational modes to other phe-
nomena in which a speaker’s subjectivity is reflected needs to be searched for in 
future studies. 
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